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We develop  an  agent-based  model  to  study  the macroeconomic  impact  of  alternative
macro-prudential  regulations  and  their  possible  interactions  with  different  monetary  pol-
icy rules.  The  aim  is to shed  light  on  the most  appropriate  policy  mix  to achieve  the resilience
of  the banking  sector  and  foster  macroeconomic  stability.  Simulation  results  show  that  a
triple-mandate  Taylor  rule,  focused  on  output  gap, inﬂation  and  credit  growth,  and  a Basel  III
prudential  regulation  is the  best  policy  mix  to  improve  the  stability  of the  banking  sector  and
smooth output  ﬂuctuations.  Moreover,  we consider  the  different  levers  of  Basel  III and  their
combinations.  We  ﬁnd  that  minimum  capital  requirements  and counter-cyclical  capital
buffers allow  to  achieve  results  close  to the Basel  III ﬁrst-best  with  a much  more  simpliﬁed
regulatory  framework.  Finally,  the  components  of  Basel  III are  non-additive:  the  inclusion
of  an  additional  lever  does  not  always  improve  the performance  of the  macro-prudential
regulation.
© 2016  Elsevier  B.V.  All  rights  reserved.
. Introduction
In this work we develop an agent-based model (ABM) to study the impact on macroeconomic dynamics of alternative
acro-prudential regulations and their possible interactions with different monetary policy rules. The aim is to shed light
n the most appropriate policy mix  to make the banking sector more resilient and foster macroeconomic stability.The recent crisis has revealed the fundamental role of credit and more generally of ﬁnancial markets in triggering deep
nd long downturns. Ng and Wright (2013) ﬁnd that in the last thirty years all recessions hitting the U.S. originated in
nancial markets. More generally, ﬁnancial crises are not rare events (apart from the calm of the 1930–1970 period), they
ccur both in developed and emerging economies, and their cost is much more severe than “normal recessions” (Taylor,
∗ Corresponding author at: Institute of Economics (LEM), Scuola Superiore Sant’Anna, Piazza Martiri della Libertá, 33 I-56127 Pisa, Italy.
E-mail addresses: l.popoyan@sssup.it (L. Popoyan), mauro.napoletano@sciencespo.fr (M. Napoletano), a.roventini@sssup.it (A. Roventini).
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2016.12.017
167-2681/© 2016 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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2015). Finally, credit booms can fuel asset price bubbles, leading to deeper recessions and slower recoveries (Jordà et al.,
2015; see also Stiglitz, 2015 on the links between credit and deep downturns).
In such a framework, monetary policy is an inadequate tool to achieve both price and ﬁnancial stability. Given the
numerous faults in the global regulatory framework and in banks’ risk management practices, a growing consensus has grown
to improve macro-prudential regulatory tools in order to better supervise the banking sector and tame ﬁnancial market
instability (Borio, 2011; Blanchard et al., 2013; Zhang and Zoli, 2014; Blundell-Wignall and Roulet, 2014; Gualandri and Noera,
2014). The policy debate is focusing in particular on the adoption, implementation and effectiveness of different macro-
prudential tools (Balasubramanyan and VanHoose, 2013; Claessens et al., 2013; Miles et al., 2013; Aiyar et al., 2014; Cerutti
et al., 2015), as well as on their impact on macroeconomic outcomes and their relationship with monetary policy (Beau et al.,
2012; Kannan et al., 2012; Agénor et al., 2013; Angeloni and Faia, 2013; Lambertini et al., 2013; Spencer, 2014; Suh, 2014).
However, many questions are still open. To name a few, how can one solve the potential conﬂict between Central Bank’s
(CB) objectives of price and ﬁnancial stability (Howitt, 2011)? Should CBs use the policy interest rate to prevent the formation
of credit bubbles (Blanchard et al., 2013)? What is the effectiveness of different combinations of macro-prudential tools?
In particular, given the increasing complexity of ﬁnancial markets, do we  need complex or simple macro-prudential rules
(Haldane, 2012)? Are monetary and macro-prudential policies complementary in increasing the stability of the banking
sector and more generally of the whole economy?1
These are the questions we are going to address extending the agent-based model (Tesfatsion and Judd, 2006; LeBaron
and Tesfatsion, 2008) developed in Ashraf et al. (2011). The model is populated by heterogenous, interacting ﬁrms, workers
and banks, a Government and a Central Bank. Firms and workers exchange goods and services in decentralized markets.
Firms need credit to ﬁnance production which is provided by banks according to the macro-prudential regulation. If ﬁrms
are not able to sell their goods, they can go bankrupt and default on their loans, possibly triggering a banking crisis. The
Government bails out banks and levies a sales tax. Finally, the Central Bank sets monetary policies according to different
types of Taylor rules and ﬁxes the macro-prudential regulation in the spirit of Basel II or III frameworks.
Our approach consider the economy as a complex, evolving system (Kirman, 1992; Colander et al., 2008), where macro-
economic outcomes do not coincide with the behavior of a representative agent, but rather emerge out of the interactions
taking place among heterogenous agents (more on that in Farmer and Foley, 2009; Kirman, 2010; Dosi, 2012). Such a
research methodology is fruitful to analyze not only how complex market economies manage to coordinate activities in
normal times (Howitt, 2011), but especially to study how major crises emerge, pushing the economy outside the stability
“corridor” (Leijonhufvud, 1973), in “dark corners” (Blanchard, 2014). As endogenous banking crises are very often at the root
of deep downturns, our agent-based approach is well suited to be employed as a laboratory to design and test how different
monetary and macro-prudential policies combinations may  impact on the resilience of the banking sector and on the overall
macroeconomic performance.2
First, we test the explanatory power of our model. We  ﬁnd that the model endogenously generates business cycles
and banking crises. Moreover the model accounts for the major co-movements of macroeconomic variables (e.g. output,
unemployment, credit, inﬂation, etc.) at business cycle frequencies. Finally, the Okun and Phillips curves are emergent
properties of the model.
We  then compare the impact of Basel II and III regulations on ﬁnancial stability and macroeconomic performance, by
carefully studying the role (both, jointly and in isolation) of the different components of the Basel III framework. The effects
of alternative macro-prudential regulations are analyzed for different Taylor rules focused on e.g. output and price stability,
unemployment, credit growth.
Simulation results show that the adoption of the Basel III regulation improves the stability of the banking sector and
the performance of the economy vis-à-vis the Basel II framework. Considering the different levers of Basel III and their
possible combinations, we ﬁnd that the minimum capital requirement cum counter-cyclical capital buffer produce results
quite close to the Basel III ﬁrst-best in a much more simpliﬁed regulatory framework, thus supporting the plea of Haldane
(2012) for simple policy rules in complex ﬁnancial systems. In particular, the contribution of counter-cyclical capital buffer
is fundamental in reducing the pro-cyclicality of credit, thus allowing ﬁrms to get more credit during recessions, i.e. when
they need it most (Bernanke et al., 1999; Gertler et al., 2007; Christensen and Dib, 2008).
We also ﬁnd that the relation among the different components of the macro-prudential regulation is not trivial. Indeed,
the effects of the adoption of the complete Basel III regulation are much stronger than the summation of the impact of its
single components. In addition, the levers of Basel III are non-additive: the inclusion of additional components does not
always improve the performance of the macro-prudential regulation.
1 Empirical ﬁndings about the effectiveness of macro-prudential instruments are few due to the scarcity of data, and they mainly focus on the static
capital  adequacy requirement and the loan-to-value ratio (see in particular Shim et al., 2013; Aiyar et al., 2014; Cussen et al., 2015; McDonald, 2015). A
growing literature also uses DSGE models to study the interactions between macro-prudential regulation and monetary policy (see e.g. Angelini et al.,
2011; Agénor et al., 2013; Angeloni and Faia, 2013; Zilberman and Tayler, 2014; Kannan et al., 2012; Quint and Rabanal, 2014; Ozkan and Unsal, 2014).
2 For germane macroeconomic agent-based models with credit and ﬁnancial markets, see Delli Gatti et al. (2005, 2010), Ashraf et al. (2011), Gai et al.
(2011), Battiston et al. (2012), Geanakoplos et al. (2012), Raberto et al. (2012, 2014), Teglio et al. (2012), Dosi et al. (2010, 2013, 2015), Lengnick et al. (2013),
Riccetti et al. (2013), Dawid et al. (2014), Poledna et al. (2014), Aymanns and Farmer (2015), Klimek et al. (2015), Krug et al. (2015), Krug (2015), Napoletano
et  al. (2015), Seppecher and Salle (2015), Da Silva and Lima (2015), van der Hoog and Dawid (2015), van der Hoog (2015), and the papers in Gaffard and
Napoletano (2012). See Fagiolo and Roventini (2012, 2017) for a critical comparison of macroeconomic policies in standard DSGE and agent-based models.
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Finally, we ﬁnd that a “leaning against the wind” monetary policy, which ﬁxes the interest rate in order to stabilize
utput and inﬂation, but also takes into account credit growth, reduces the inﬂation rate and achieves the best results in
erms of output stabilization. Our results thus suggest that the joint adoption of a triple-mandate Taylor rule and a Basel III
rudential regulation allows the Central Bank to reduce the conﬂict between price and ﬁnancial stability (see e.g. Howitt,
011; Blanchard et al., 2013).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe the model. We  then present simulation results in
ection 3. Finally, Section 4 concludes.
. The model
The model studies the possible complementarities between different macro-prudential measures,3 and alternative mon-
tary policies, in an economy populated by heterogenous, interacting agents. Its closest antecedent is the model developed
n Ashraf et al. (2011),4 which we expand by providing a more detailed account of bank’s decisions and balance-sheets, and
y exploring different types of macro-prudential regulation in the vein of Basel II and III frameworks.
In the model, there are N agents and M banks. The production possibilities contemplate n varieties of non-perishable
oods, which are manufactured employing n different types of labor. Each agent z is characterized by the coefﬁcients (i, j),
here i denotes the goods she is able to produce, and j and j + 1 capture respectively her primary and secondary consumption
oods. In line with Ashraf et al. (2011), we assume that agents cannot consume the goods they produce, i.e. i /= j and i /= j + 1.
his forces them to trade in the labor and goods markets. As there is one agent for each type of good, the population of our
rtiﬁcial economy is equal to N = n(n − 2).
The real sector is composed of specialized traders – the “shops” – which produce and sell different types of consumption
oods, forming trading relationship with agents. The varieties of shops correspond to the ones of goods produced in the
conomy (n). A shop i employs labor of type i to produce a good of the same varieties which will be sold in the market. Each
gent can be employed only in one shop and she has only one supplier for her primary and secondary consumption goods.
rading and employment relationships evolve endogenously over time. Each shop is owned by an agent. In order to open a
hop, an agent has to invest (part of) her wealth. Shops produce using labor only and they ﬁx their price (pi,t) applying an
fter-tax mark-up on the wage rate (wi,t).
In the economy, there is a ﬁxed number M of banks, indexed by m,  with the same number of customers. The banking sector
rovides credit to open new shops or to ﬁnance production if the wealth of the shop owner is not sufﬁcient for that purpose.
oans are made with full recourse and are collateralized by inventories. Prudential regulation constrains the endogenous
upply of credit in the economy. Beyond loans and seized collateral, banks can hold money and government bonds. Banks
re heterogenous in terms of their balance sheets and may  go bankrupt if shops do not pay back their loans, thus triggering
 banking crisis.
The Central Bank (CB) is responsible for monetary policy and it sets the nominal interest rate following different types of
aylor rules (cf. Section 2.9.2). Moreover, the CB supervises the banking system and ﬁxes the macro-prudential regulation
Basel II vs. III, more on that in Section 2.9.3).
The Government levies a sales tax and it employs the gathered resources to recapitalize banks whenever they do not
atisfy the minimum capital requirements ﬁxed by the macro-prudential regulation. In case of deﬁcits, the Government
ssues bonds which are bought by banks and, as a residual, by the Central Bank.
In the next sections, we ﬁrst provide a description of the timeline of events in any given time step (cf. Section 2.1). We
hen present a description of how agents (ﬁrms, workers, banks) take their decisions and interact in the goods, labor, and
redit markets (see Sections 2.2–2.8). Finally, in Section 2.9, we  describe how ﬁscal, monetary and macro-prudential policies
re ﬁxed.
.1. The timeline of events
In the model, time steps correspond to months. In every time period t, the sequence of events runs as follows:. policy variables (e.g. baseline interest rate, sales tax rate, etc.) are ﬁxed;
. new shops enter the market;
. search and matching occur in the goods and labor markets;
. trading in ﬁnancial markets occur;
. labor and good market trading takes place;
3 Micro-prudential instruments typically focus on the health of individual ﬁnancial institutions. In contrast, macro-prudential policy tools are directed
o  address risks concerning the ﬁnancial system as a whole. The literature (see e.g. Osinski et al., 2013) traditionally considers the measures in the Basel II
nd  Basel III accords – taken as a whole – as macro-prudential regulation. We shall follow the same rule in this paper, although single tools in each package
e.g.  the leverage ratio or the liquidity coverage ratio in Basel III) have instead a micro-prudential character.
4 See also Howitt and Clower (2000), Howitt (2008), Howitt (2006), and Ashraf et al. (2016).
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6. bankrupted shops and banks exit;
7. wages and prices are set.
At the end of each time step, aggregate variables (e.g. output, inﬂation, unemployment, etc.) are computed, summing
over the corresponding microeconomic variables.
2.2. Shop entry
At the beginning of each period, each person who  is not already a shop owner or a bank owner can become a potential
entrepreneur with probability /N (1    N). A potential entrepreneur can open a shop only if she can afford to pay the
setup cost S (expressed in units of her consumption good) with her stock of available liquid resources. The liquidity of agents
is composed of money and deposits plus the credit line provided by banks, which is equal to 0 if the agent did not receive a
line of credit in the previous period, and to Ph,t(S + Ii,t) otherwise, where I is the potential entrepreneur’s stock of inventories
and Ph is the haircut price discussed later in Eq. (9).
Once the setup cost requirement is satisﬁed the potential entrepreneur checks whether entry in the market is proﬁtable.
The expected proﬁts from entry, i,t, read as:
i,t = wi,t(i,tytrgi,t − (F − 1)) − wi,t iDt (y
trg
i,t
+ F − 1) > 0, (1)
where wi,t is the wage rate and F is the ﬁxed cost (also expressed in terms of units of type i labor). In the above equation,
the ﬁrst term represents the operative margin of the shop owner, the second one captures the opportunity cost of investing
in the shop instead of in a deposit account yielding an interest rate iDt . The potential entrepreneur decides to enter if the
business plan is viable, i.e. if i,t > 0.
If the proﬁtability test is successful, the potential shop owner checks whether she can actually produce and sell its product
at the current market conditions. More speciﬁcally, she sends to an unemployed worker a job offer specifying the wage, and
to a potential consumer (i.e. a randomly chosen agent whose primary consumption good is the same as the entrepreneur’s
production good) the selling price of the product. The wage rate is equal to:
wi,t = Wt(1 + ∗)(+1)/2, (2)
where Wt is the publicly known (employment-weighted) average wage rate computed by the Government across all shops,
 is the ﬁxed contract period and * is the Central Bank’s target inﬂation rate.5 The unemployed worker will agree to be
hired by the new shop if her effective wage (determined according to Eq. (13)) is less than the one offered by the potential
entrepreneur, i.e. if wefft < wi,t/(1 + ∗). Similarly, the potential consumer will become a customer of the new shop if her
effective price, pefft is greater than the one offered by the ﬁrm, p
nor
i,t
, i.e. if pefft > p
nor
i,t
/(1 + ∗). The price pnor
i,t
is equal to
pnori,t =
(1 + i,t)
(1 − ) wi,t, (3)
where  is the sales tax rate and i,t is the mark-up.
2.3. Search and matching in goods and labor markets
Agents try to form new trading relationships both in the goods and labor markets. In the latter, workers engage in job
search with probability  (with 0 ≤  ≤ 1). Once they search, they ask for a job to another randomly chosen agent who
produces the same type of goods. The contacted agent can either be a shop owner or a worker, who  then pass the job
application to her employer. In both cases, the labor contract is signed and the searcher is hired if: (a) the labor employed
in the last period by the shop owner who received the application is not sufﬁcient to meet her current input target; (b) the
wage offered to the searcher is higher than her effective one.
Likewise, every agent searches for a potential new shop. In their search consumers ﬁrst ask the effective retail price to
a randomly chosen agent with the same consumption good. If that attempt is unsuccessful (i.e. the price is higher than the
currently paid price), the consumer asks the price to a randomly selected shop, which may  trade or not her consumption
good. The consumer will become a customer of the new shop if the price is lower than the one of her current supplier. Once
search and matching activities are concluded, agents adjust their balance sheets and set their expenditures plan. Before
discussing the latter, let us ﬁrst consider the functioning of banks and of the credit market.2.4. Banks and credit
The balance sheet of the banking sector is represented in the fourth column of Table 1. The assets of bank m are constituted
by loans to shops Lsm, cash H
b
m, Government bonds B
b
m, collaterals SC
b
m seized from defaulted shops and valued at ﬁresale prices
5 Inﬂation target is equal to 3%, which is the average in the U.S. over the 1984–2006 period.
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Table  1
The balance-sheet matrix of the model.
Consumer Shop Bank Gov CB 	
Deposit +Dc +Ds −(Dc + Ds), + D(R) −D(R) 0
Loan  −Ls +Ls , − Lcb +Lcb 0
Bond  +Bb −B +Bcb 0
Inventory +I, − SCb +SCb +I
HPM +Hc +Hs +Hb −Hcb 0
Balance −Ec −Es −Eb +GD −I
  0 0 0 0 0 0
N
a
(
o
d
l
f
w
e
r
d
m
o
o
w
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t
b
J
a
i
(
f
d
b
f
a
i
w
aote: The matrix describes the accounting structure of the model. All rows related to ﬁnancial assets or liabilities sum to zero except the inventories which
re  connected to tangible capital.
cf. Eq. (10)), and reserves D(R)m at the Central Bank. Banks are indeed obliged to hold minimum reserves against deposits
f shops (Dsm) and consumers (D
c
m). More precisely, bank’s reserves are equal to D(R)m,t = 
(Dsm,t + Dcm,t), with 0 < 
 < 1.
The liabilities of bank m are constituted by deposits, Dsm and D
c
m, and by loans provided by the Central Bank, L
cb
m . Banks
emand for CB loans originates from prudential regulation. More speciﬁcally, if the Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR, deﬁned
ater in Section 2.9.3) falls below a minimum value b, the bank cannot supply new loans and thus asks for liquidity advances
rom the Central Bank in order to restore the minimum ratio. Bank’s m liquidity demand to the CB is thus equal to:
Lcbm,t = zz{b(Dsm,t + Dcm,t) − Bbm,t − D(R)m,t − Hbm,t}, (4)
here zz = 1 if LCR < b and zz = 0 otherwise.
Furthermore, the equity of bank m (Ebm) is obtained by subtracting bank’s liabilities from her assets. Banks with negative
quity fail. In this case the Government ﬁrst injects money to fully recapitalize the new bank to fulﬁll the minimum capital
equirement (discussed in Section 2.9.3). Next, a new bank owner is chosen. Notice that such procedure guarantees that
eposits are never destroyed after bank failures.
Credit supply depends on bank’s equity. First, the Central Bank checks if a bank satisﬁes the prudential regulation require-
ents akin to Basel II or III framework (and described in details in Section 2.9.3). If a bank does not satisfy one of the conditions
f the prudential regulation, it is considered “troubled” and it is not allowed to provide new loans. The total supply of credit
f a non-troubled bank m is equal to:
Lsupm,t =
1
b
Ebm,t − (Lsm,t + SCbm,t), (5)
here the b stands for the minimum capital requirement of Basel II and III (respectively b = 2 and b = 3), Ebm is the equity of
he bank, Lsm,t is her current stock of loans and SC
b
m,t is the stock of collaterals. Note that (L
s
m,t + SCbm,t) measures the bank’s
otal exposure to credit risk.
Banks grant loans to shops according to a “6C” approach to creditworthiness. Such a method is commonly employed by
anks to determine the ﬁnancial and economic situation of the loan applicant and its potential future revenues (see e.g.
iang, 2007). More speciﬁcally, the aim of the “6C” analysis is to provide a positive answer to the following questions about
 shop demanding a loan: (i) Can the shop pay its loan? (capacity check); (ii) Does the shop have enough liquidity to pay
ts loan if a period of adversity arises? (capital check); (iii) Will the bank be protected if the shop fails to repay the loan?
collateral check); (iv) Did the shop pay back its loans in the past? (credit reputation check); (v) Are there some known
actors that could adversely affect the shop’s ability to pay back its loan? (credit conditions check); (vi) Does the shop owner
emonstrates the ability to make wise decisions? (common sense check).
In real economies, banks following the “6C” approach use both objective credit ratios and more subjective evaluations
ased on privileged information resulting from the historical experience with their borrowers. In the current model, we
ocus our attention only on objective ratios, which are caught by the ﬁrst three “C’s” of credit rating, namely capital, capacity
nd collateral. The “capacity” of the lender will be measured employing the “quick ratio” (QR) and the “return on asset” (ROA)
ndicators:
QRi,t =
Current Assets − Inventories
Current Liabilities
=
Ds
i,t
+ Hs
i,t
− Ii,t
Ls
i,t
≥ , (6)
ROAi,t =
Net income (after tax) =
s
i,t
s s ≥ , (7)Total assets D
i,t
+ H
i,t
+ Ii,t
here Ds
i
and Hs
i
are respectively shop i’s deposits and cash (i.e. their internal liquid resources), Ii, is the value of inventories,
nd s
i,
are the proﬁts. Finally,  and  are bounded between zero and one.
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The capital check is captured by the “debt to equity” ratio (DER):
DERi,t =
Total liabilities
Equity
=
Ls
i,t
Es
i,t
≥ , (8)
with 0 <  < 1.6 Finally, in accordance with the third component of the “6C” (the collateral check), loans are fully secured and
they are provided to shops in exchange of a collateral. As ﬁrms in the model have only working capital, their collateral is
represented by their stock of inventories. The value of inventories is assumed to be equal to their marginal cost of production
Wt(1 + *). Each bank applies a constant loan-to-value ratio h on this unit value. The ﬁnal price of collateral is thus set as:
Ph,t = hWt(1 + ∗). (9)
The above pricing rule implies that a bank will always lend a share h of each unit of inventories it receives as collateral. The
total size of a loan to a ﬁrm is therefore equal to
Lsi,t = Ph,t(Ii,t + S) = hWt(1 + ∗)(Ii,t + S),
with S > 0 whenever the shop owner is an entrant and S = 0 otherwise.7 Note that the rate h captures the risk tolerance of
banks when providing credit to a ﬁrm. In what follows, we  assume h to be ﬁxed and homogeneous across banks. In particular,
we set its value to 0.5, which is quite conservative and implies a prudent and “safe” behavior of banks.
Shops that pass the bank’s creditworthiness test are eligible for loans. They receives credit whenever the bank’s total
credit risk exposure remains below the limit imposed by regulation. If the residual credit supply of the bank (see Eq. (5)) is
not enough to satisfy a shop’s credit demand, the shop is credit rationed (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981).
If the shop owner is unable to repay its loan, the bank seizes all her collateralized inventories and the deposits up to the
amount of the shop’s exposure. Seized assets (SCb) are present in bank’s balance sheet until sold in ﬁresale markets (see
Section 2.6) with a ﬁresale price Pf equal to:
Pf,t =
Wt(1 + ∗)
2
. (10)
Banks set the interest rate on new commercial loans (iL) as well as on deposits (iD) held at the end of the previous stage. The
interest rate on loans is common across all banks and it is ﬁxed applying an annual spread (s > 0) on the baseline interest
rate set by the Central Bank (i)8:
iLt = it + s/12 (11)
The deposits interest rate is equal to the baseline interest rate, i.e. iDt = it .
2.5. Budget planning
Agents decide their planned consumption expenditures and relatedly their stock of assets. First, they adjusts their
permanent income according to the following adaptive rule:
Ypz,t = p(Yz,t − Ypz,t−1),
where Yz is actual income, Y
p
z is her permanent income, and p is the adjustment speed parameter.
Agents plan consumption expenditures (CEz) as a ﬁxed fraction  of their total wealth Az, and permanent income:
CEz,t = (Az,t + Ypz,t) (12)
The ﬁnancial wealth (A) of a worker corresponds to the sum of money holdings (Hc), bank deposits (Dc), plus the resale value of
the stock of inventories (if any) in ﬁresale markets (Pf * I). For shop owners, ﬁnancial wealth is equal to the sum of money (Hs)
and deposit holdings (Ds) minus outstanding loans (Ls). Finally, the ﬁnancial wealth of a bank owner is constituted by money
Hb, and if the bank is not troubled, by the bank’s equity after subtracting required capital, i.e. Bbm,t + (CEbm,t − b(Lsm,t + SCm,t)).
The balance-sheets of all the types of agents are reported in Table 1. Notice that the model is stock-ﬂow consistent (see e.g.
the seminal contribution of Godley and Lavoie, 2007).Once planned consumption expenditure is set, agents decide how to reallocate their wealth portfolio across different
ﬁnancial assets. We  assume that all agents are subject to a cash-in-advance constraint. Accordingly, they need a stock of
money when they visit shops to pay for the goods they want to buy.
6 The values of the parameters are in line with commercial banks’ internal regulatory practices, see Table 10 in Appendix A.
7 The setup cost is speciﬁed in terms of units of the consumption good of the shop’s owner and is therefore part of the unencumbered capital of the shop.
8 In our simulations we  assume that the value of the annual loan spread s is equal to the average spread between lending and deposit rates for all
commercial and industrial loans during the period 1986–2008.
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Let us consider workers ﬁrst. They own Hcz in cash and D
c
z in deposits and must choose the level of deposits Dcz and money
alances Hcz to ﬁnance their consumption plans respecting the constraint:
Dcz,t = (1 + iDt )(H
c
z,t + D
c
z,t − Hcz,t).
iven the cash-in-advance constraint, the worker/consumer needs to have money when she visits shops. However, she does
ot know whether she will receive her wage before or after shopping. As a consequence, she must employ her current wealth
o ﬁnance her planned expenditures CEj. This implies that if CEj,t ≤ Hz,t + Dz,t , the worker sets CEz,t = Hz,t and leaves the rest
n her bank account. Otherwise, CEz,t = Hz,t = Hz,t + Dz,t .
Next consider the portfolio allocation of a bank owner. If she owns a troubled bank, her consumption expenditures CEz
re bounded by current money holdings Hz . If the latter exceeds CEz, the bank owner deposits the difference Hz,t − CEz,t in
er bank account. Otherwise, she sets CEz,t = Hz,t = Hz,t . If the bank is not troubled and CEz,t ≤ Az,t, the owner ﬁxes Hz,t = CEz,t
nd leaves the surplus Az,t − CEz,t in bank equity. Otherwise, she sets Hz,t = CEz,t = Az,t.
Finally, consider the portfolio reallocation of a shop owner. Beyond money Hz and deposits Dz, a shop owner can also take
 loan Lz up to her credit limit. If the shop has already a credit line and the bank is not troubled, the credit limit equal to the
aircut value of her eligible collateral (determined in Eq. (9)). Accordingly, the shop owner’s ﬁnancial constraints will be:
Hz,t − Hz,t = Dz,t − Dz,t
1 + iDt
+ Lz,t
1 + iLt
− Lz,t,
Lz,t ≤ Ph,t(It + S)(1 + iLt ).
here Hz,t ≥ 0, Dz,t ≥ 0, Lz,t ≥ 0 and where Hz , Dz and Lz are the current levels of, respectively, cash, deposits, and bank loans.
he shop owner can satisfy the above constraints and repay back his loan only if Hz,t + Dz,t + Ph,t(It + S) ≥ Lz,t .
.6. Labor and goods market trading
Let us now consider how agents interact in the ﬁresale, labor and goods markets.
Firesale markets. The supply side of ﬁresale markets is constituted by banks selling foreclosed capital, and former shop
wners liquidating their inventories. The buyers in ﬁresale markets are shops, whose actual level of inventories are lower
han their inventory target (which in turn is equal to their sale target). A buyer is matched to the ﬁrst seller (if any) in the
th queue. If the ﬁrst seller in the queue cannot fullﬁl the whole order, the shop buys from the next one, and so on, until
ither the order is satisﬁed or the queue runs out of sellers. Buyers pay their orders with deposits and then, if necessary,
ith credit. Once ﬁresale markets close, workers engage in labor and goods market trading.
Labor markets. Shops ﬁx their posted wage w according to Eq. (15). Employees offer to trade their endowment in exchange
or an effective wage equal to
wefft = min(wi,t, Hi,t), (13)
here H is the employer’s money holdings (if H = 0, the worker will not supply labor). The shop accepts the offer of the
orker unless its labor input exceeds its target and the ratio of inventory-to-sales target (IS) exceeds the critical threshold
alue IS > 1. Shop owners are self-employed and they use their endowment as an input.
Goods markets. Consumers learn the selling price ps of the primary and secondary good they want to consume (s = 1, 2)
nd they send orders for some amount cs given the cash-in-advance constraint pc  H. Given their level of inventories (I),
hops then sell an amount ceff = min(cs, I). The effective price paid by consumers is thus equal to p
eff
s = pscs/ceffs . Consumers
hoose their desired consumption bundle (c1;c2) in order to maximize the utility function:
u(c1, c2) = cε/(ε+1)1 + c
ε/(ε+1)
2 , (14)
ith the demand parameter ε > 0, and subject to the budget constraint p1c1 + p2c2 = E..7. Exit
At the end of each period bankrupted shops exit. A shop fails if the value of her ﬁnancial wealth is lower than the value
f her outstanding loans:
Asi,t = Hsi,t + Dsi,t + Ph,t ∗ Ii,t − Lsi,t < 0
f the bankrupted shops had loans, the bank seizes the collateralized inventories, and, if necessary, put shop’s deposit to zero.
ankrupted shops will ﬁre their workers, who will then become unemployed, and they will break their trading relationships
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in the goods market. Besides bankruptcy, a shop can exit also for some exogenous reasons with probability ı. In addition, it
can voluntarily choose to exit if it is not able to pay for the ﬁxed cost of the next period.9
Bank faces losses whenever one of their clients goes bankrupt. As a consequence, banks can fail if their equity becomes
negative:
Ebm,t = Lsm,t + Hbm,t + Bbm,t − (Dsm,t + Dcm,t) − Lcbm,t < 0.
In such a case, a new bank owner is chosen by selecting the richest customer (i.e., the one with the highest sum of cash and
deposit holdings) of the bank who is not already an entrepreneur. If the new bank owner has some legacy capital, the value
of the latter is placed in the bank’s balance sheet. Equity is then updated to take into account the variations occurred in the
balance sheet of the bank.
2.8. Wage and price setting
At the end of every period, shops update their prices and wages. First, shops compute their sales target ytrg
i,t
, by setting it
equal to past sales. Next, they update their wages. Shops change their posted wage every  periods, according to:
w = w
[(
1 + ˇ
(
xtrg/xpot − 1
))
(1 + ∗)
]/12
, (15)
where w is the current wage, xtrg and xpot are respectively the average input target and potential input10 over the past 
periods, and the parameter  ˇ captures the degree of wage (and price) ﬂexibility in the economy.
Once wages are set, shops proceed to change prices. Recall from Eq. (3) that the “normal” price is equal to pnor
i,t
= (1 +
)wi,t/(1 − ). Shops will stick to their normal price unless there is a big mismatch between inventories and sales target.
More speciﬁcally, shops have an inventory-to-sale ratio (IS). If the demand LC is stronger than expected and inventories fall
too much, the shop will increase its price by the factor ıp, whereas it will cut the price by ı−1p if inventories accumulate too
fast:
pi,t =
⎧⎨
⎩
pnor
i,t
∗ ıp, if LC < ytrgi,t ∗ IS
−1
pnor
i,t
∗ ı−1p , if LC > ytrgi,t ∗ IS
pnor
i,t
, otherwise
Notice that in such framework, the frequency of price changes is endogenous.
2.9. Fiscal, monetary and macro-prudential policies
To complete the exposition of the model, let us present how ﬁscal, monetary and prudential policies are implemented in
our artiﬁcial economy.
2.9.1. Fiscal policy
The Government levies a sales tax  on transactions occurring in the goods markets. It employs the collected revenues to
recapitalize banks, thus providing public bail out of the ﬁnancial sector. As a consequence, public deﬁcit can arise. In such a
case, the Government issues bonds that are bought by banks and, if necessary, by the Central Bank.
To keep public ﬁnances under control, the Government updates the sales tax rate according to the evolution of the ratio
between sovereign debt and GDP. More speciﬁcally, ﬁrst the Government computes the level of government debt relative
* *to annual estimated potential output (y , see Section 2.9.2). Then, it adds to  – the tax rate that stabilize the debt-to-GDP
ratio in absence of entry and breakup shocks – an adjustment factor proportional to the difference between the actual and
target debt-to-GDP ratio b*:
t = ∗ + 
(
Bt
Pt(1 + im,t)(12ey∗ ) − b
∗
)
, (16)
where B is the total stock of government bonds, P is the current price level,  is the adjustment parameter, and 1 + im is the
monthly interest rate, i.e. 1 + im,t = (1 + it)1/12.
9 Notice that this occurs in the model whenever the liquid wealth of the shop owner (and thus the sum of her cash holding, deposits and loan of the
bank)  is below the value of the ﬁxed cost.
10 Potential input corresponds to the number of agent having an employment relationship with the shop, even if they were laid off or if they refused to
work because they were not paid.
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The Government also computes the average wage rate W of the economy as the employment-weighted average wage
cross all shops.
.9.2. Monetary policy
The Central Bank performs monetary policy by setting the nominal interest rate i via different types of Taylor rule (Howitt,
992; Taylor, 1993).
In the benchmark scenario, the CB follows a dual-mandate Taylor rule (TR,y), where the interest rate is ﬁxed according
o the difference between current and target inﬂation and output gap:
ln(1 + it) = max{ln(1 + i∗t ) + ϕ(ln(1 + t) − ln(1 + ∗)) + ϕy((yt − y∗t ), 0} (17)
here ϕ and ϕy are ﬁxed coefﬁcients (ϕ > 1 and 0 < ϕy < 1), (1 + t) is the inﬂation over the past 12 months, * is the ﬁxed
nﬂation target, yt is the log GDP, y∗t is the CB’s estimate of log potential output and i
∗
t = r∗t + ∗.11 As the Central Bank does
ot know the natural interest rate and the potential output of the economy, it must estimate them adaptively. It adjusts r*
ccording to the difference between current and target inﬂation with an adjustment speed r. It then estimates y∗t employing
n AR(1) model whose parameters are re-estimated right after r* is adjusted.
We also consider a “conservative” Taylor rule (TR), where the Central Bank only cares about inﬂation stabilization:
ln(1 + it) = max{ln(1 + i∗t ) + ϕ(ln(1 + t) − ln(1 + ∗)), 0}, (18)
ith ϕ > 1. Next, we study a monetary rule in which the Central Bank responds to inﬂation and unemployment dynamics
TR,u, see also Dosi et al., 2015; Yellen, 2014; Walsh, 2009):
ln(1 + it) = max{ln(1 + i∗t ) + ϕ(ln(1 + t) − ln(1 + ∗) + ϕU(ln(Ut) − ln(U∗t )), 0} (19)
ith ϕ > 1, ϕU ≥ 1 and U* is the target unemployment rate (Dosi et al., 2015). Finally, we  explore the impact of a “three-
andate” Taylor rule, where the Central Bank takes into account credit dynamics beyond price and output stabilization
TR,y,c):
ln(1 + it) = max
{
ln(1 + i∗t ) + ϕ(ln(1 + t) − ln(1 + ∗)) + ϕy(yt − y∗t ) + ln
(
Ct
Ct−1
)ϕc
, 0
}
(20)
ith ϕ > 1, 0 < ϕy < 1 and 0 ≤ ϕc ≤ 1. The inclusion of credit growth – a measures of ﬁnancial vulnerability – in the Taylor rule
rovides a connection between monetary and macro-prudential policies (more on that in Lambertini et al., 2013; Ozkan and
nsal, 2014; Verona et al., 2014).
.9.3. Macro-prudential policy
The primary objective of macro-prudential policy is to limit systemic ﬁnancial risk in order to minimize the incidence of
isruptions in the provision of key ﬁnancial services that could have serious consequences for ﬁnancial markets as well as
or the real economy. Macro-prudential policies aim to achieve these results by (i) dampening the building up of ﬁnancial
mbalances; (ii) building defenses that contain the speed and sharpness of ﬁnancial downswings and of their effects on
he real economy; (iii) identifying and addressing common exposures, risk concentrations, and interdependencies in the
nancial system which could be sources of contagion, thus jeopardizing the functioning of the system as a whole.
This is the policy milieu in which the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) issued the so called Basel III reform
f global regulatory standards (see BCBS, 2011). To study the impact of different prudential policies in the model, as well as
heir interactions with alternative monetary policy rules, we  start from the old Basel II framework and we then study the
ifferent levers of Basel III.
Basel II framework. This is the benchmark prudential policy scenario in the model. Under the Basel II regulatory frame-
ork, the minimum capital requirement (CAR2), deﬁned as the ratio between bank’s capital (TC) and its weighted assets
RWA) must not to be lower than 2 = 8%12:
CAR2m,t = TCm,t
RWAm,t
= E(T1)
b
m,t + E(T2)bm,t
Lsm,t + SCbm,t
≥ 2. (21)
n the model, RWA  corresponds to the sum of loans to shops and seized collaterals.13 The bank’s total capital (TC) is the sum
f Tier 1 (E(T1)) and Tier 2 (E(T2)) equities. E(T1) is the core equity capital and E(T2) is the supplementary capital computed
s earnings form ﬁresale market liquidations and revaluations.
Basel III framework. Given the unsatisfactory performance of the Basel II prudential regulation, the Basel Committee
as tried to increase the resilience of the banking sector by designing the Basel III framework, which is grounded on two
11 Adjustment parameters on inﬂation and output gap are set in line with Woodford (2001) and are Taylor’s original speciﬁcation (Taylor, 1993).
12 Minimum capital requirement in Basel II is taken form Basel II regulatory (BCBS, 2004).
13 Risk-weighted assets (RWA) are computed by adjusting each asset class for risk in order to determine bank’s exposure to potential losses. Following
asel  II and Basel III requirements, loans to shops and seized collateral are weighted with 100% whereas cash, government bonds and reserves are considered
iskless and have a weight equal to zero.
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frameworks, namely the global capital framework and the global liquidity requirements. The global capital framework focuses
on strengthening capital adequacy requirements, as well as on the introduction of a new leverage requirement and of
counter-cyclical macro-prudential measures. The global liquidity requirements are based on the liquidity coverage ratio in
order to protect the ﬁnancial system from potential liquidity disruptions.
Global capital framework.  The regulatory capital framework is grounded on three indicators that banks have to simulta-
neously satisfy: the minimum static capital requirement, the counter-cyclical capital buffer, and the leverage requirement.
1. Minimum static capital requirement (CAR3) is akin to the one computed in Basel II. However, the new index focuses on
common equity, which is the highest quality component of banks’ capital:
CAR3m,t = Tier1m,tRWAm,t =
E(T1)bm,t
Lsm,t + SCbm,t
≥ 3,
where 3 must be at least 4.5% according to the Basel III regulation.
2. Counter-cyclical capital buffer (CCB) supplements the CAR3 and it is supposed to dampen the destabilizing credit pro-
cyclicality resulting from the Basel II framework. More speciﬁcally, the measure consists in the determination of the level
of add-on of the bank capital determined by CAR3 in order constitute a safe buffer against risk (Drehmann and Gambacorta,
2012; Behn et al., 2013; Drehmann and Tsatsaronis, 2014). The aim is to achieve the broader macro-prudential goal of
protecting the banking sector from periods of excess aggregate credit growth, which are often associated with the building
up of system-wide risk. In the model, the CCB is determined as follows: (i) compute the aggregate private sector (shops)
credit-to-GDP ratio; (ii) compute the credit-to-GDP gap as the difference between the credit-to-GDP ratio and its long-run
trend.14 The size of the buffer add-on (as a percent of risk-weighted assets) is zero when the credit-to-GDP gap (Gt) is
below the threshold J. It then increases with Gt until the buffer reaches its maximum level H. After that it stays at the
upper bound of 2.5% of risk-weighted assets. More formally:
 = CCBm,t =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
0, if Gt < J
(Gt − J)
(H − J) ∗ 0.025, if J ≤ Gt ≤ H
0.025, if Gt > H
where 0 ≤  ≤ 0.025. The analysis performed by the Basel committee has found that an adjustment factor based on J = 2
and H = 10 provides a reasonable and robust speciﬁcation based on historical data about banking crises.
3. The leverage requirement (LR) is designed to constrain excess leverage in the banking system, also providing an extra
layer of protection against model risk and measurement errors. In that, the non-risk based LR serves as a backstop to the
risk-based capital measures (Jarrow, 2013; Kiema and Jokivuolle, 2010):
LRm,t = Tier1m,tTotal Assetsm,t =
E(T1)bm,t
Lsm,t + SCbm,t + Bbm,t + D(R)m,t + Hbm,t
≥ ˛,
with  ˛ = 3%.
Global liquidity requirement. The recent ﬁnancial crisis has highlighted the importance of liquidity for the proper function-
ing of ﬁnancial markets and of the banking sector. Hence, the Basel Committee introduced the liquidity coverage ratio (LCR)
(Cooke et al., 2015; Calomiris et al., 2014; De Nicolò et al., 2012; Bindseil and Lamoot, 2011). The LCR builds on traditional
liquidity coverage methodologies already internally used by banks to assess exposures to stress events. More speciﬁcally,
the LCR requires a bank’s stock of unencumbered high-quality liquid assets (HQLA) to be larger than the expected net cash
outﬂows (NCOF)15 over a 1 month-long stress scenario:
LCRm,t =
HQLAm,t
NCOFm,t
≥ ,
14 We assume that the credit-to-GDP indicator follows a linear trend based on OLS estimation of 5 years (ﬁrst 5 years are transient). The coefﬁcients of
regression are recursively updated using data from the start of the observation period (5 periods) up to end 60 years. The trend forecast is performed on
yearly  bases.
15 The “expected” net cash outﬂow refers to a special terminology of Basel III rule’s deﬁnition. It means the possible cash outﬂows of bank balance-sheet
components computed on a base of run-off rates of assets and liabilities.
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Table 2
U.S. data vs. median model-generated outcomes.
Variable U.S. data Model
Inﬂation 3.0 2.9396
Inﬂation volatility 1.3 0.6711
Unemployment 6.1 5.8804
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aReal interest rate 1.8 3.2097
Bank failure rate 0.51 0.5000
GDP gap volatility 2.0–3.2 2.7796
ith  = 1. In the model, we employ the Level 2 deﬁnition of HQLA provided by the Basel III regulatory framework16:
HQLAm,t = D(R)m,t + Hbm,t + min[0.85Bbm,t; 0.75(D(R)m,t + Hbm,t)].
otal expected net cash outﬂows (NCOF) are calculated by multiplying the size of liabilities and assets by the rates at which
hey are expected to, respectively, run off or default in a situation of liquidity stress.17 The LCR rules specify the run-off
nd default rates for the different types of liabilities and assets in the stress scenario. Let O
b(−)
t and O
b(+)
t denote the current
ontractual cash outﬂows and inﬂows of the bank. Expected cash outﬂows, Ex[Ob
(−)
t ], and expected cash inﬂows, Ex[O
b(+)
t ],
re then calculated as follows:
Ex[Ob
(−)
m,t ] = O
b(−)
m,t +
n∑
e=1
ϑeLiab
e
m,t = O−m,t + ϑD(Dsm,t + Dcm,t) + ϑcbLcbm,t
Ex[Ob
(+)
m,t ] = O
b(+)
m,t −
n∑
a=1
ϑaAsset
a
m,t = O+m,t − ϑsLLsm,t + ϑHHbm,t + ϑbBbm,t + ϑD(R)D(R)m,t,
here ϑD = 0.1, ϑcb = 0.25, are the run-off rates of liabilities, and ϑsL = 0.5, ϑH = 0, ϑb = 0.2 and ϑD(R) = 0 are the default rates
f assets as speciﬁed in the Basel III accord. Accordingly, NCOFm,t = Ex[Ob(−)m,t ] − Ex[Ob
(+)
m,t ].
. Simulation results
We  analyze the model via computer simulations running a Monte Carlo exercise composed of 150 independent runs,
hose time span covers sixty years.18 Before employing the model to address policy issues (see Section 3.2), we  study its
xplanatory capability, i.e. the set of stylized facts it is able to replicate (cf. Section 3.1). The values of the parameters of the
odel are spelled out in Table 10 in Appendix A.
.1. Empirical validation
The time series of output gap, inﬂation and the real interest rate generated by the model are presented in Fig. 1. The
odel exhibits endogenous business cycles (see the output time series), as well as ﬂuctuations in the inﬂation rate between
% and 4%. The real interest rate is rather stable over time.
We then report in Table 2 the averages of some relevant U.S. macroeconomic variables for the period 1986–2008 and we
ompare them with the ones produced by our model. We  ﬁnd that the average values of inﬂation, unemployment, output-gap
olatility and bank failure rate generated by the model are not that far from real ones.
In order to study the behavior of macroeconomic variables at business-cycle frequencies, we ﬁlter them with a HP-ﬁlter
nd we compute standard deviations and cross-correlations. The results are reported in Table 3 (see Appendix B for the cross-
orrelations found in U.S. data by Stock and Watson, 1999). In line with this empirical evidence, we ﬁnd that inventories
re more volatile than GDP, while the ﬂuctuations of consumption are milder. The co-movements between output and the
ther macroeconomic variables suggest, again well in tune with empirical works (see Stock and Watson, 1999; Napoletano
16 More precisely, two types of assets can be considered to compute the HQLA. Level 1 assets include cash Hbt and Central Bank reserves Dt(R). Level 2
ssets  cannot be higher than 40% of bank’s total HQLA, i.e. they can be at most two  thirds of the quantity of Level 1 assets. Moreover, Level 2 assets enter in
he  HQLA with a 15% haircut. All assets included in the calculation must be unencumbered (e.g. not pledged as collateral) and operational (e.g. not used as
 hedge on trading positions).
17 The run-off rates of liabilities as well as the default rates of assets are ﬁxed by the Basel committee of bank supervision and are general for all banks.
or  more details see BCBS (2013) and Keister and Bech (2012).
18 Extensive tests show that the results are robust to changes in the initial conditions for the microeconomic variables of the model. In addition, they
how  that, for the statistics under study, Monte Carlo distributions are sufﬁciently symmetric and unimodal. This justiﬁes the use of across-run averages
s  meaningful synthetic indicators. All our results do not signiﬁcantly change if the Monte Carlo sample size is increased.
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Fig. 1. The time series of output, inﬂation and real interest rate (50 years). Note: The time series are depicted from the 11th year since the ﬁrst 10 years
are  accounted as transient because of the learning process.
Table 3
Cross-correlation structure of output and other macro variables. Simulated series have been detrended with HP ﬁlter ( = 100).
Variable St. Dev t − 4 t − 3 t − 2 t − 1 t t + 1 t + 2 t + 3 t + 4
GDP 1.5611 0.1556 0.4762 0.7814 0.9487 1.0000 0.9487 0.7814 0.4762 0.1556
Unemployment 0.7192 −0.7705 −0.8147 −0.8554 −0.8868 −0.8877 −0.8096 −0.6544 −0.3936 −0.1511
Chng.  in inv. 0.4122 −0.4030 0.0732 0.2401 0.3926 0.5216 0.4613 0.2930 0.1507 −0.0952
Credit  2.4530 0.4822 0.4599 0.4446 0.4367 0.4242 0.4068 0.3683 0.3268 0.2775
Consumption 1.1408 −0.0516 0.0816 0.3270 0.5752 0.7108 0.6724 0.4933 0.3673 0.0462
Inﬂation 0.3631 −0.0851 0.0311 −0.2117 0.2646 0.4222 0.1043 0.1174 −0.1435 −0.1894Fig. 2. Model-generated Okun’s curve. OLS estimation of the relationship between the percentage change in output and the percentage change in unem-
ployment. R2 = 0.1204. The H0: “the estimated coefﬁcient is not signiﬁcantly different from zero” is rejected at the 1%.
et al., 2006), that consumption, inventories, inﬂation and credit are pro-cyclical, whereas unemployment is counter-cyclical
(compare Table 3 with the one in Appendix B).Finally, for each simulation scenario we estimated the Okun’s law and the Phillips curve (see Figs. 2 and 3). Both curves
are qualitatively similar to those estimated on U.S. data (cf. Figs. 6 and 7 in Appendix B) and reveal that both Okun’s law and
the Phillips curve are robust emergent properties of the model.
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Fig. 3. Model-generated Phillips curve. OLS estimation of the relation between inﬂation and unemployment. R2 = 0.2346. The H0: “the estimated coefﬁcient
is  not signiﬁcantly different from zero” is rejected at the 1%.
Table 4
Normalized values of average output gap across experiments.
TR,y TR TR,u TR,y,c
Basel II 1.0000 1.6702* 1.3264 0.9671**
(0.1025) (0.0854) (0.0622)
Basel III 0.6214** 1.4402 1.0231* 0.5838**
(0.0533) (0.1851) (0.1532) (0.0652)
LCR  + LR 1.1610* 1.8261 1.4820** 1.0792
(0.2013) (0.2490) (0.4632) (0.3025)
CAR3 + CCB + LCR 0.8114* 1.6017 1.2207** 0.7816*
(0.0892) (0.1283) (0.1455) (0.1095)
CAR3 + CCB + LR 0.8816** 1.6501 1.2671* 0.8200**
(0.1186) (0.5329) (0.4239) (0.0958)
CAR3 + CCB 0.7185** 1.5114* 1.1351* 0.6741*
(0.0685) (0.1752) (0.1459) (0.0867)
CAR3 1.0314* 1.7284 * 1.3614 0.9822*
(0.3695) (0.3967) (0.3055) (0.2011)
LR  1.2185** 1.8700* 1.5128 1.1370*
(0.2511) (0.3058) (0.2395) (0.1733)
LCR  1.0605 1.7802* 1.4103** 1.0384**
(0.3675) (0.4962) (0.3421) (0.3251)
Basel III prudential tools: LCR, liquidity coverage ratio; LR,  leverage ratio; CAR3, capital adequacy ratio; CCB, counter-cyclical capital buffer. Monetary policies:
TR,y , dual-mandate Taylor rule; TR , conservative Taylor rule; TR,u , unemployment and inﬂation Taylor rule; TR,y,c , three-mandate Taylor rule (output gap,
inﬂation and credit growth). Note: Absolute value of the simulation t-statistic of H0: “no difference between baseline and the experiment” in parentheses.
* Signiﬁcant at 10% level.
** signiﬁcant at 5% level.
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a.2. Monetary and macro-prudential policies
We  now explore the possible interactions between different macro-prudential policies and alternative monetary rules on
 range of target variables. These include output gap, output gap volatility, inﬂation, unemployment, likelihood of economic
rises (deﬁned as a drop of GDP higher than 3%) and bank failure rate. The results of the policy experiments are reported
n Tables 4–9. Each entry in a table returns the ratio between the Monte Carlo average of the macroeconomic variable
enerated under a given prudential and monetary policy combination and the one in the benchmark scenario (i.e. Basel II
nd dual-mandate Taylor rule).
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Table 5
Normalized values of average output gap volatility across experiments.
TR,y TR TR,u TR,y,c
Basel II 1.0000 2.2412** 1.9641* 0.9250**
(0.5294) (0.3259) (0.0942)
Basel  III 0.9468 * 2.0655 ** 1.8917 0.8901 **
(0.1102) (0.6288) (0.4410) (0.0925)
LCR  + LR 1.3122* 2.5201 * 2.3014 ** 1.1655 *
(0.3860) (0.8264) (0.7641) (0.5012)
CAR3  + CCB + LCR 0.9195** 1.9855** 1.8700 * 0.8731 **
(0.1382) (0.6680) (0.5213) (0.2384)
CAR3  + CCB + LR 0.9764 ** 2.1602 1.9318 * 0.9109**
(0.1866) (0.6778) (0.5840) (0.1600)
CAR3  + CCB 0.8964* 1.8582* 1.6721** 0.8433 **
(0.1497) (0.4673) (0.4025) (0.1102)
CAR3  1.2465** 2.3188* 2.0264* 0.9866**
(0.3300) (0.7025) (0.6754) (0.1758)
LR  1.3864* 2.8402 2.6358 * 1.2208 *
(0.4013) (0.8547) (0.7821) (0.3451)
LCR  1.2700* 2.4561* 2.2318** 1.0852 **
(0.2750) (0.6475) (0.5821) (0.2245)
Note: Absolute value of the simulation t-statistic of H0: “no difference between baseline and the experiment” in parentheses.
* Signiﬁcant at 10% level.
** Signiﬁcant at 5% level.
Table 6
Normalized values of average unemployment rate across experiments.
TR,y TR TR,u TR,y,c
Basel II 1.0000 3.5013 * 0.7811** 0.8241*
(2.1258) (0.1358) (0.1584)
Basel  III 0.8517* 1.8955 * 0.6514 ** 0.7016*
(0.1685) (0.8654) (0.1254) (0.1469)
LCR  + LR 1.5344 * 5.1182 1.0645* 1.3899
(0.4658) (1.2325) (0.4258) (0.5218)
CAR3  + CCB + LCR 0.9611 * 2.3184* 0.7600 0.7955**
(0.0962) (0.8545) (0.2358) (0.2690)
CAR3  + CCB + LR 1.2460** 4.0281* 0.8294* 1.1482**
(0.5002) (1.5248) (0.3325) (0.4114)
CAR3  + CCB 0.9123* 2.0277* 0.7014** 0.74213**
(0.0896) (0.7562) (0.0921) (0.0654)
CAR3  1.2864* 4.4823 0.8654* 1.2088**
(0.6950) (1.9024) (0.1254) (0.2650)
LR  1.6895** 5.4921 1.1682 * 1.5360*
(0.8521) (2.0232) (0.7024) (0.8921)
LCR  1.4950** 4.8902* 0.9267* 1.3688*
(0.6201) (1.6408) (0.2368) (0.5503)Note: Absolute value of the simulation t-statistic of H0: “no difference between baseline and the experiment” in parentheses.
* Signiﬁcant at 10% level.
** Signiﬁcant at 5% level.Macro-prudential policies. Let us start by comparing for the baseline monetary policy scenario (TR,y), the impact of the
different levers of the Basel III regulation (CAR3, CCB, LR,  LCR) with respect to Basel II one.19 First, the introduction of the
Basel III agreement appears to stabilize the banking sector and to improve the performance of the economy. Indeed, with
19 We do not study the performance of the economy with CCB as a standalone instrument. The reason is that both in the U.S. and in the E.U., the CCB
is  conceived as a variable add-on to the capital adequacy requirement ratio (CAR3), in order to protect banks against risks stemming from the ﬁnancial
cycle. In addition, employing CCB as a standalone instrument can lead banks to have no capital buffer in some scenarios. This implies no protection against
adverse  events, and thus a very high bank failure rate and negative macroeconomic performance.
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Table  7
Normalized values of average inﬂation rate across experiments.
TR,y TR TR,u TR,y,c
Basel II 1.0000 0.9316 * 1.1200 ** 1.1758**
(0.0162) (0.2468) (0.3102)
Basel  III 1.0714 ** 0.9516** 1.1599* 1.2301**
(0.1932) (0.1600) (0.2841) (0.3125)
LCR  + LR 0.9695* 0.8612 1.0597* 1.1312*
(0.0435) (0.0385) (0.0984) (0.1524)
CAR3  + CCB + LCR 1.0456** 0.9452* 1.1395 1.1900**
(0.1457) (0.0854) (0.2450) (0.2987)
CAR3  + CCB + LR 0.9864* 0.8801* 1.0892 1.1587**
(0.0954) (0.0755) (0.1751) (0.2285)
CAR3  + CCB 1.0602* 0.9466* 1.1402* 1.2130**
(0.0954) (0.0854) (0.0458) (0.3654)
CAR3  0.9795* 0.8702 * 1.0675* 1.1400
(0.0754) (0.0597) (0.4407) (0.6279)
LR  0.9617* 0.8586 1.0582 1.1300**
(0.0667) (0.0597) (0.4685) (0.5218)
LCR  0.9725** 0.8694 1.0602** 1.1388*
(0.0722) (0.0654) (0.5027) (0.6425)
Note: Absolute value of the simulation t-statistic of H0: “no difference between baseline and the experiment” in parentheses.
* Signiﬁcant at 10% level.
** Signiﬁcant at 5% level.
Table 8
Normalized values of average likelihood of economic crisis across experiments.
TR,y TR TR,u TR,y,c
Basel II 1.0000 3.2105* 1.8233** 0.7781*
(0.3440) (0.1687) (0.0864)
Basel III 0.8125** 2.6572 ** 1.2385* 0.6125**
(0.0966) (0.2854) (0.1796) (0.0697)
LCR  + LR 1.2601 3.8351* 2.0614 0.9245**
(0.4851) (0.6854) (0.5766) (0.0785)
CAR3 + CCB + LCR 0.8867** 2.7714** 1.3145* 0.7122**
(0.0796) (0.3287) (0.1985) (0.0895)
CAR3 + CCB + LR 0.9105* 2.8125* 1.4864 ** 0.7521**
(0.0883) (0.4012) (0.1968) (0.0907)
CAR3 + CCB 0.8465** 2.7241 1.2864** 0.6511**
(0.0698) (0.3864) (0.1766) (0.0776)
CAR3 1.2100** 3.6212 * 1.9545* 0.8125**
(0.5120) (0.6987) (0.3296) (0.1052)
LR  1.3256* 3.9012* 2.1455** 1.0264 *
(0.5880) (0.7655) (0.4856) (0.2387)
LCR  1.2385* 3.8008 2.0254* 0.8752**
(0.5017) (0.7554) (0.4628) (0.1284)
N
r
c
e
r
tote: Absolute value of the simulation t-statistic of H0: “no difference between baseline and the experiment” in parentheses.
* Signiﬁcant at 10% level.
** Signiﬁcant at 5% level.
espect to the Basel II scenario, the output gap and its volatility, the average unemployment, the likelihood of economic
rises and the bank failure rates are signiﬁcantly lower. Furthermore, the type of macro-prudential regulation has limited
ffect on inﬂation (see also Suh, 2012; Spencer, 2014), which seems instead to be more dependent on the monetary policy
ule implemented20 (see also discussion below).
We now consider which levers of the Basel III regulation allow a performance improvement over the benchmark pruden-
ial scenario. More speciﬁcally, we compare the impact of each Basel III lever alone and in combinations. We  ﬁnd that the
20 The average inﬂation rate is 2.94% under the Basel II regime and 3.15% in the Basel III regulatory framework.
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Table 9
Normalized values of average bank failure rate across experiments.
TR,y TR TR,u TR,y,c
Basel II 1.0000 5.1672* 1.9431** 0.7614**
(1.9872) (0.6975) (0.3597)
Basel  III 0.5216* 3.2382* 1.1285 ** 0.4131**
(0.2875) (1.3854) (0.7854) (0.1987)
LCR  + LR 3.8211** 8.1452* 4.0314** 1.1852**
(1.5024) (1.5495) (1.0258) (0.8861)
CAR3  + CCB + LCR 1.6827* 7.2591* 2.1901** 0.9288**
(0.7932) (1.4335) (0.7574) (0.3854)
CAR3  + CCB + LR 1.6411* 7.1286* 2.0861** 0.9213*
(0.5922) (1.5028) (0.8643) (0.4025)
CAR3  + CCB 0.8234** 3.8820* 1.8701* 0.7102**
(0.3125) (1.1368) (0.8625) (0.4021)
CAR3  2.0134* 7.8713 2.2288* 1.0382**
(1.0125) (1.6584) (0.6580) (0.5461)
LR  4.2164* 8.1722** 4.5012* 1.2151*
(1.2854) (1.5891) (1.0368) (0.5687)
LCR  4.6002* 8.1924* 4.9215 * 1.2275 **
(1.3258) (1.6998) (1.0351) (0.6258)Note: Absolute value of the simulation t-statistic of H0: “no difference between baseline and the experiment” in parentheses.
* Signiﬁcant at 10% level.
** Signiﬁcant at 5% level.
joint adoption of minimum static capital requirement (CAR3) and counter-cyclical capital buffer (CCB) is the major driver of
the improved performance of the economy under the Basel III framework. Indeed, the results in the CAR3 + CCB scenario are
almost as good as the ones attained in the Basel III one, but with a much more simpliﬁed regulatory framework (in the case
of output gap volatility, they are even better). This supports the conjecture of Haldane (2012) and Aikman et al. (2014), about
the trade off between complex and simple policy rules. In that, the contribution of the counter-cyclical capital buffer is fun-
damental. The CCB dampens the pro-cyclicality of credit, thus correcting the destabilizing impact of capital requirements. In
a ﬁnancial accelerator framework (see Bernanke et al., 1999, 1994; Gertler et al., 2007), the introduction of counter-cyclical
capital buffer reduces credit booms during expansions, allowing banks to have more solid balance sheets in recessions, thus
providing more credit to ﬁrms when they need it most (in line with the results in Ashraf et al., 2011).
The performance of the economy worsens in the LR,  LCR, and LCR + LR scenarios. The negative impact of such instruments
is due to the fact that, by cutting down ﬁnancial leverage (without the underpinning of the CAR3 and CCB components), they
trigger credit crunches and reduce shops’ production and overall economic activity.
Finally, our results suggest that complexity is a pervasive feature of the macro-prudential regulatory framework. Indeed,
the effects of the joint adoption of all levers of Basel III are much stronger than the summation of the standalone impact
of each single tool (thus conﬁrming the conjectures of Arnold et al., 2012; Ojo, 2014). These patterns clearly emerge from
the tables reporting the results of our policy experiments. Consider for example the combined impact of macro-prudential
and monetary policy on output gap in Table 4. The CAR3 improves the output gap in comparison to Basel II. Augmenting
CAR3 with the CCB improves the situation even more. However, adding to CAR3+CCB either LCR or LR has negative effects
on the output gap, whereas augmenting CAR3+CCB with both of them (Basel III) brings the best outcome compared to the
Basel II baseline. Similar conclusions can be reached by studying the impact of the different Basel III levers on the other
macroeconomic indicators as well as on the bank failure rate.
If the different instruments of the Basel III were completely independent then we should observe that their impact on
macroeconomic performance simply adds up. The above results show that this is not the case. Instead, they indicate that the
different instruments interact in quite complex ways. For instance, in the CAR3 + CCB + LR scenario, the leverage ratio LR often
becomes the binding constraints for banks,21 forcing them to hold a higher proportion of liquid assets, thereby reducing
the supply of credit to ﬁrms (for more details see GFMA et al., 2013). In the CAR3 + CCB + LCR scenario, banks increase the
liquidity coverage ratio by replacing loans with liquid assets. The result is again a reduction of the total credit supply and an
adverse effect on overall economic performance.We further spotlight the impact of different macro-prudential regulation on the banking sector by employing boxplots,
which report the minimum, maximum, median, ﬁrst and third quartile of the bank failure rate distribution (cf. Fig. 4).
The plots conﬁrm that the Basel III regulatory framework dominates Basel II, by minimizing the bank failure rate. The
21 Incidentally, note that a study commissioned by the Global Financial Markets Association and The Clearing House concludes that the leverage ratio
would become the binding capital ratio for more than half of the institutions analyzed (see GFMA et al., 2013).
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lFig. 4. Boxplot comparing the impact of macro-prudential tools on bank failure rate.
second-best” results is attained when the CAR3 and CCB levers of Basel III are activated, even if the support of the distribution
s wider and it overlaps more with the Basel II framework. In line with our previous ﬁndings, addressing only liquidity risk
y implementing the liquidity requirement (LCR) or the leverage ratio (LR) as well as the combination of both (LR + LCR)
onsiderably increases the instability of the banking sector.
To shed more light on the impact of the bank failure rate on the performance of the economy, we  report in Table 12
n Appendix C the correlations between the bank failure rate and the macro variables generated by model for different
ombinations of macro-prudential and monetary policies. We ﬁnd that the bank failure rate is negatively correlated with
ggregate credit and positively correlated with the other macroeconomic indicators. This further highlights how the ﬁnancial
ccelerator mechanism affects macroeconomic performance in the model.22
Finally, we  assess the robustness of our policy conclusions by performing a sensitivity analysis wherein we perturbate
he parameters of macro-prudential policy scenarios. More speciﬁcally, for each macro-prudential regulation, we  increase
nd reduce by 30% the related policy parameter and we record the deviation from the baseline average values of output
ap, unemployment, and inﬂation. The results reported in Fig. 5 suggest that the policy recommendations drawn from the
odel are solid: only in the CAR3 + CCB scenario, the variation of the macroeconomic variables is slightly higher than 1%.
n the other cases, the policy parameters appear to have a little impact on macroeconomic variables (see also Table 13 in
ppendix C).
To sum up, we found that in the benchmark monetary policy scenario, macro-prudential regulation considerably affects
acroeconomic dynamics. Moreover, the Basel III and CAR3 + CCB scenarios are complementary to monetary policy in tam-
ng macroeconomic instability by increasing the resilience of the ﬁnancial system. In particular, the performance of the
AR3 + CCB scenario is very close to the one of the full-ﬂedged Basel III framework. Finally, we  ﬁnd that the different levers
f Basel III add up in a non-linear way: the joint contribution of the instruments to the ﬁnancial resilience of the economy is
igher than the sum of their stand-alone impact, and adding an additional lever to an existing combination may  reduce the
erformance of the regulatory framework (e.g. introducing the LCR or LR in the CAR3 + CCB scenario). Are such results robust
o alternative monetary rules? What is the best combination of monetary and prudential policies?
Monetary policy. Let us study the performance of different Taylor rules and the possible interactions with the macro-
rudential framework. More speciﬁcally, we run a horse-race competition among a dual-mandate Taylor rule (TR,y), where
he Central Bank aims to stabilize inﬂation and the output gap, a “conservative” Taylor rule (TR), in which the Central Bank
ares only about inﬂation, an unemployment dual-mandate Taylor rule (TR,u), where unemployment stabilization replaces
he output gap, and a triple-mandate Taylor rule (TR,y,c), in which the interest rate is ﬁxed taking into account credit growth.
he results are spelled out in Tables 4–9.
22 More precisely, higher BFR brings a shortage on loan supply and a shrinkage in aggregate loan portfolio. In turn, the credit crunch brings both a drop
n  GDP and a rise in unemployment (banks are failing, not providing a loan to shops and the latter are not producing), and higher GDP gap volatility and
ikelihood of crises (due to frequent perturbation in credit availability).
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Fig. 5. Impact on macroeconomic variables of macro-prudential parameter perturbation.
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First, we ﬁnd that the rank of macro-prudential rules is robust to different monetary policy regimes. The Basel III regulation
eturns the lowest output gap, unemployment rate, likelihood of crisis, and bank failure rate even if the Central Bank follows a
conservative” Taylor rule or responds to unemployment and credit variations. The CAR3 + CCB rule ranks always second and
t attains the best results in taming output gap volatility. Both the Basel III and the CAR3 + CCB regulations do not minimize
he average inﬂation rate, which nevertheless is still quite low (the minimum and maximum inﬂation rate attained in the
imulations are respectively 1.1% and 4.7%).
How do different monetary policy rules fare once the macro-prudential scenario is ﬁxed? The results are not as crystal
lear as those related to prudential regulation. The triple-mandate Taylor rule (TR,y,c) achieves the best results in terms of
utput gap, likelihood of economic crises, output gap volatility, and bank failure rate (see Quint and Rabanal, 2014; Ghilardi
nd Peiris, 2014). These results suggest that a “leaning against the wind” monetary policy, which also takes into account
redit dynamics, allows to avoid periods of excessive credit growth, and thus increases the stability of the banking sector and
he performance of the economy. However, a Central Bank that wants to minimize the average unemployment rate should
x the interest rate according to the inﬂation rate and the unemployment gap (TR,u). Finally, a “conservative” Taylor rule
llows instead to minimize the average inﬂation rate (TR).
Overall, the above results suggest that the best mix  between monetary policy and macro-prudential regulation depends
n the speciﬁc objectives pursued by regulators (stabilization of output and ﬁnancial sector vs. low unemployment
s. inﬂation stabilization). In particular, the joint adoption of Basel III regulation and a monetary rule focused on out-
ut, inﬂation and credit allows to smooth credit ﬂuctuations, thereby increasing the resilience of the banking sector
nd taming ﬁnancial and macroeconomics instability. This is in line with the results of Jordà et al. (2015) pointing out
hat the joint adoption of “leaning against the wind” monetary strategy and counter-cyclical macro-prudential policy
llows to dampen excessive credit and leverage growth thus minimizing the risk of dangerous ﬁnancially-originated
ecessions.
. Conclusion
We  extended the agent-based model developed by Ashraf et al. (2011) in order to study the impact on the stability of
he ﬁnancial sector and on the performance of the economy of different macro-prudential regulations and their interactions
ith alternative monetary policy rules.
We  ﬁrst tested the capability of the model to replicate an ensemble of macroeconomic empirical regularities. Next, we
erformed simulation exercises to study different policy combinations. We  ﬁnd that monetary policy and macro-prudential
egulation are complementary in increasing the resilience of the banking sector and improving the performance of the
conomy. Such results can be obtained with the joint adoption of a triple-mandate Taylor rule, focused on output gap,
nﬂation and credit growth, and a Basel III prudential regulation. Furthermore, even if the Basel III framework returns the
est results in terms of ﬁnancial and macroeconomic stability, similar results can be attained by adopting a simpler regulatory
ramework grounded on the capital adequacy ratio and counter-cyclical capital buffer. In that our paper contributes to the
ebates about the trade-off between complex vs. simple policy rules (for more details see Haldane, 2012; Aikman et al.,
014). Finally, the joint impact on the stability of the banking sector of the whole Basel III regulation is considerably larger
han the sum of standalone levers, suggesting the complexity of the prudential framework, where additivity of different
easures cannot be taken for granted.
Our work could be extended in several ways. First, an interbank market should be introduced, where credit institutions
ould exchange funds against collaterals (repo). This would allow us to study in more detail the impact of macro-prudential
nd monetary policies on the stability of the banking sector. Relatedly, one could study how the network topology of the
nterbank network is inﬂuenced and affect the effects of different prudential and monetary policy combinations (see e.g. Gai
t al., 2011). Moreover, the presence of an interbank market is a pre-requisite to analyze the possible interactions between
acro-prudential policies and non-conventional monetary interventions such as different declinations of quantitative eas-
ng. Second, for a given interbank structure, one could study the “too big to fail” and “too connected to fail” problems, trying
o develop and test policy that could sterilizing the impact of systemically important banks on macroeconomic dynamics
see e.g. Ueda and di Mauro, 2013; Castro and Ferrari, 2014).
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Appendix A. Parameters
Table 10
Parameters of the model.
Parameter Description Value
Prudential regulation parameters
˛ Leverage requirement 0.03
  Liquidity requirement 1
2 Minimum capital requirement in Basel II 0.08
3 Minimum capital requirement in Basel III 0.045
  Counter-cyclical capital buffer [0, 0.025]
ϑD Run-off rate of deposit 0.1
ϑcb Run-off rate of central bank loan 0.25
ϑL Run-off rate of commercial loan 0.5
ϑb Run-off rate of gov. bonds 0.2
Bank parameters
 Quick ratio 0.5
 Debt-to-equity ratio 0.5
  Return on assets 0.1
s  Loan spread 0.0175
h  Loan-to-value ratio 0.5

  Reserve requirement 0.03
Fiscal and monetary policy parameters
ϕ Inﬂation coefﬁcient in Taylor rule 1.5
ϕy Output gap coefﬁcient in Taylor rule 0.5
ϕU Unemployment coefﬁcient in Taylor rule 1.1
ϕc Credit coefﬁcient in Taylor rule 0.7
* Target inﬂation rate 0.03
r Adjustment speed of evolving real rate target 0.0075
b* Target debt-to-GDP ratio 0.33
 Fiscal adjustment speed 0.054
Worker/consumer parameters
ε Demand parameter 7.0
p Permanent income adjustment speed 0.4
  Frequency of innovation 100
  Job search probability 0.5
Shop parameters
 Average percentage markup over wage 0.138
S  Setup cost 15
IS  Critical inventory-to-sales ratio 3.0
ıp Size of price cut 1.017
ˇ  Wage adjustment parameter 0.3
  Length of the contract period 12
Appendix B. U.S. macroeconomic regularities
Table 11
Cross-correlation structure of output and other macro variables for the U.S. economy (1953–1996) from Stock and Watson (1999). Series detrended with
BPF  (6,32,12).
Variable St. Dev t − 4 t − 3 t − 2 t − 1 t t + 1 t + 2 t + 3 t + 4
GDP 1.66 0.03 0.33 0.66 0.91 1 0.91 0.66 0.33 0.03
Unemployment 0.76 −0.27 −0.55 −0.80 −0.93 −0.89 −0.69 −0.39 −0.07 0.19
Change  in inventories 0.38 −0.32 −0.04 0.28 0.57 0.73 0.72 0.56 0.32 0.08
Credit  3.29 0.67 0.75 0.74 0.63 0.46 0.25 0.06 −0.08 −0.15
Consumption 1.26 −0.07 0.21 0.51 0.76 0.90 0.89 0.75 0.53 0.29
Inﬂation 1.44 0.58 0.64 0.62 0.52 0.35 0.14 −0.08 −0.27 −0.40
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Fig. 6. Estimated U.S. Okun’s curve. OLS estimation of the relationship between the percentage change in output and the percentage change in unem-
ployment. Sample period: Q1/2000–Q4/2014. R2 = 0.1313. The H0: “the estimated coefﬁcient is not signiﬁcantly different from zero” is rejected at the 1%.
Source: FRED Dataset. Output: Real Gross Domestic Product (s.a.), Unemployment: Civilian Unemployment Rate (s.a).
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cig. 7. Estimated U.S. Philips Curve. OLS estimation of the relationship between inﬂation and unemployment. Sample period: Q1/2000–Q4/2014. R2 = 0.2792.
he  H0: “the estimated coefﬁcient is not signiﬁcantly different from zero” is rejected at the 1%. Source: FRED Dataset. Inﬂation: Percentage change in CPI
or  all urban consumers (s.a.), Unemployment: Civilian Unemployment Rate (s.a).
ppendix C. Additional simulation results
able 12
ross-correlation structure of bank failure rate and macro variables under different combinations of macroprudential and monetary policies. H0: “no
orrelation”.
MacroPru Variable
Credit GDP Gap GDP Gap Vol. Unempl. Inﬂation Lik. econ. crises
“Dual-mandate” monetary policy – TR,y
Basel II −0.3452** 0.3604** 0.2812* 0.1389* 0.4858*** 0.5036**
Basel III −0.4096** 0.5340*** 0.2051** 0.4608*** 0.4793*** 0.5287**
LCR + LR −0.3116** 0.2164* 0.1891* 0.1232** 0.7360*** 0.4101*
CAR3 + CCB + LCR −0.2708* 0.2339* 0.1954* 0.1106* 0.8246*** 0.4566**
* * ** *** *CAR3 + CCB + LR −0.2633 0.2671 0.2187 0.1599 0.7667 0.3974
CAR3 + CCB −0.3414** 0.4682*** 0.3007* 0.2303* 0.7532*** 0.5974**
CAR3 −0.3005* 0.1691** 0.1225** 0.2439* 0.6365*** 0.4772**
LR −0.3306** 0.3665* 0.2451* 0.1505* 05115*** 0.4322*
LCR −0.2580* 0.2997* 0.1973* 0.4134*** 0.8057*** 0.3741*
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Table 12 (Continued)
MacroPru Variable
Credit GDP Gap GDP Gap Vol. Unempl. Inﬂation Lik. econ. crises
“Leaning against the wind” monetary policy – TR,y,c
Basel II −0.2910** 0.2736* 0.2544* 0.1434* 0.6869*** 0.4253*
Basel III −0.2885* 0.3885** 0.2761** 0.4112** 0.6383*** 0.6297**
LCR + LR −0.2465** 0.1775* 0.1701 0.4124** 0.8667*** 0.4402*
CAR3 + CCB + LCR −0.3988** 0.4280*** 0.2204 0.1572* 0.7860*** 0.5047*
CAR3 + CCB + LR −0.3173 * 0.3027* 0.1544* 0.2538* 0.7144*** 0.5292**
CAR3 + CCB −0.2994* 0.3230** 0.2451** 0.3355** 06366*** 0.5801*
CAR3 −0.3588* 0.2446* 0.1864* 0.2002** 0.6625*** 0.3864**
LR −0.3876** 0.4881** 0.1699* 0.3511** 0.3305** 0.4087
LCR  −0.3195* 0.2598* 0.1689* 0.3320** 0.5889*** 0.3645*
* Signiﬁcant at 10% level.
** Signiﬁcant at 5% level.
*** Signiﬁcant at 1% level.
Table 13
Deviation of average output gap, unemployment and inﬂation from the baseline average macroeconomic variables.
CAR(B2) CAR(3)+CCB LCR LR
+30% −30% +30% −30% +30% −30% +30% −30%
Output gap 0.0035* −0.0033** 0.0116** −0.0070* 0.0032** 0.0018* 0.0013 −0.0011*
(0.0867) (0.1189) (0.0497) (0.1205) (0.0897) (0.1871) (0.2284) (0.3185)
Unemployment 0.0021* −0.0023* 0.0148** −0.0112* −0.0102* 0.0078 −0.0027* 0.0028*
(0.2491) (0.2084) (0.0941) (0.1287) (0.04861) (0.1018) (0.1911) (0.1754)
Inﬂation −0.0038* 0.0040* −0.0097* 0.0012** 0.0028 −0.0026* 0.0014 −0.0012
(0.0974) (0.1694) (0.0775) (0.1931) (0.1413) (0.2084) (0.1021) (0.1856)
Prudential tools: LCR, liquidity coverage ratio; LR,  leverage ratio; CAR, capital adequacy ratio under Basel II requirement; CAR3, capital adequacy ratio under
Basel  III requirement; CCB, counter-cyclical capital buffer. Note: H0: “not different from zero”.
* Signiﬁcant at 10% level.
** Signiﬁcant at 5% level.
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